A b s t r a c t -T h i s paper relates t h e problems TVA h a s experienced w i t h some of its f r e e s t a n d i n g o i lf i l l e d c t ' s .
INTRODUCTION
TVA began purchasing f r e e s t a n d i n g o i l -f i l l e d c t ' s w i t h t h e advent of its purchase of a i r b l a s t b r e a k e r s (1965) .
The first 500-kV c t f a i l u r e occurred a t TVA's Cordova S u b s t a t i o n on June 27, 1969, but TVA d i d not become o v e r l y concerned because i t was thought t o be a random f a i l u r e . However, by l a t e 1978 f o u r 161-kV c t ' s l o c a t e d a t TVA's Raccoon Mountain Pumped-Storage P l a n t had experienced v i o l e n t d e s t r u c t i v e failures.
A t t h a t time, TVA, working w i t h t h e manufacturer, b e l i e v e d t h e failures t o be t h e r e s u l t of i n s u l a t i o n damage caused by high-frequency t r a n s i e n t s generated by t h e a r c i n g of i s o l a t i n g b r e a k e r d i s c o n n e c t i n g switches. The manufacturer a t t r i b u t e d t h e cause of t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s u f f i c i e n t bond o r t i g h t n e s s between an
o u t e r m e t a l l i c b r a i d and semiconducting paper t h a t acts as both s h i e l d i n g and a v o l t a g e g r a d i e n t . S i n c e t h e f a i l u r e s occurred a t TVA's Raccoon Mountain on l a r g e 161-kV, 5,000-and 6,000-ampere type et's, e f f o r t s t o r e s o l v e t h e problem were c o n c e n t r a t e d a t t h i s l o c a t i o n .
A l l 5,000-and 6,000-ampere c t ' s were r e t u r n e d t o t h e manufacturer f o r design m o d i f i c a t i o n s ( r e f e r t o f i g u r e 1 ) i n 1978, and 3,000-ampere e t ' s were m o d i f i e d a t TVA's Power S e r v i c e S h o p s u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e manufacturer.
After u n d e r g o i n g d e s i g n m o d i f i c a t i o n s , a l l o r i g i n a l 161-kV c t ' s were r e t u r n e d t o s e r v i c e and subsequent purchases of s i m i l a r c t ' s i n c l u d e d t h e new d e s i g n changes.
TVA f e l t comfortable w i t h t h e s e m o d i f i c a t i o n s and thought t h a t they would eliminate t h e t y p e s of f a i l u r e s they had experienced previously.
Figure 1. EYEBOLT OR THROUGH TYPE CT t h r e e of t h e r e b u i l t 161-kV e t ' s l o c a t e d a t Raccoon Mountain experienced c a t a s t r o p h i c d e s t r u c t i v e f a i l u r e s similar t o t h e o r i g i n a l f a i l u r e s .
(On J u n e 29 and September 4, 1985, e x p l o s i v e f a i l u r e s occurred a g a i n b r i n g i n g t h e t o t a l number of c a t a s t r o p h i c -t y p e f a i l u r e s a t Raccoon Mountain t o n i n e . ) Soon a f t e r t h e failures i n 1983, t h e manufacturer expressed concern t h a t , s i n c e a l l t h r e e f a i l u r e s of t h e modified e t ' s o c c u r r e d a t A complete summary of all 500-and 161-kV o i lf i l l e d f r e e s t a n d i n g ct f a i l u r e s as of August 26, 1986 , is t a b u l a t e d i n f i g u r e 2. Note t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e e i g h t 500-kV c t f a i l u r e s and t h i r t e e n 161-kV c t f a i l u r e s , e i g h t 500-kV e t ' s and e i g h t e e n 161-kV ct's were removed because of gassing. Under o b s e r v a t i o n a r e f o u r t e e n 500-kV c t ' s and s i x 161-kV et's. TVA is not a l o n e i n t h e f a i l u r e of f r e e s t a n d i n g o i l -f i l l e d ct's.
Raccoon Mountain, system c o n d i t i o n s a t t h a t l o c a t i o n might have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a i l u r e s .

However, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a i l u r e s a t Raccoon Mountain, TVA a l s o experienced e x p l o s i v e c t f a i l u r e s a t o t h e r l o c a t i o n s .
The f o l l o w i n g t a b u l a t i o n lists a d d i t i o n a l l o c a t i o n s where c a t a s t r o p h i c f a i l u r e s of o i l -f i l l e d f r e e s t a n d i n g e t ' s occurred
A summary of r e p l i e s t o t h e 1985 Doble t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n n a i r e i n d i c a t e s e x t e n s i v e f a i l u r e s on o i l -f i l l e d ctls.
One company r e p o r t e d
It.
. . 16 e x p l o s i o n s o f t h i s k i n d o f c u r r e n t t r a n s f o r m e r --p r o b a b l y d u e t o h i g h -f r e q u e n c y o v e r v o l t a g e s produced by t h e s w i t c h i n g o f d i s c o n n e c t s w i t c h e s . "
A n o t h e r company r e p o r t s " S e v e r a l t r a n s f o r m e r s o f t h i s t y p e had a h i s t o r y of very high hydrogen i n o i l .
This t r a n s f o r m e r had been degassed f o r two days p r i o r t o f a i l u r e .
F a i l u r e was v i o l e n t throwing p o r c e l a i n up t o 100 yards.
F a i l u r e probably s t a r t e d as t r a c k i n g from one l a y e r t o a n o t h e r of t h e i n s u l a t i o n . " A n o t h e r company r e p o r t s " C u r r e n t t r a n s f o r m e r exploded due t o i n s u l a t i o n f a i l u r e . Direct c o n t a c t between g a s b l a n k e t and o i l i n small expansion chamber allowed n i t r o g e n g a s t o d i s s o l v e i n o i l and subsequently reappear as small bubbles which lodged a g a i n s t paper i n s u l a t i o n . " Another company r e p o r t e d "The c u r r e n t transformer f a i l e d , exploded, and caught fire." I n a l l , 13 companies r e p o r t e d 34 v i o l e n t f a i l u r e s o f f r e e s t a n d i n g o i l -f i l l e d c t l s . I n a s e p a r a t e i n c i d e n t r e p o r t e d i n t h e May 6 , 1985 i s s u e of u e c t r i g m i t v Week, a f r e e s t a n d i n g c t exploded a t Palo Verde P l a n t c a u s i n g $500,000 worth of damage. The manager of t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n system s a i d t h a t t h e ct had been energized f o r approximately f o u r hours and was about t o be deenergized when t h e e x p l o s i o n occurred. The f o r c e o f t h e b l a s t d i s i n t e g r a t e d most of t h e equipment and t h e ensuing f i r e , f e d by 200 g a l l o n s of i n s u l a t i n g o i l , burned f o r about f o u r hours b e f o r e i t was e x t i n g u i s h e d w i t h chemicals.
This c o r r o b o r a t e s t h e type of damage TVA has experienced.
Some of "A's 500-kV ct's have o i l i n e x c e s s of 400 g a l l o n s and t h e r e s u l t i n g f i r e and e x p l o s i o n do e x t e n s i v e damage ( r e f e r t o f i g u r e s 3 and 4 ) .
A neighboring u t i l i t y had a v i o l e n t 230-kV c t f a i l u r e a t a n u c l e a r p l a n t and after removing t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l c t l s because of g a s s i n g e l e c t e d t o r e p l a c e a l l e x i s t i n g f r e e s t a n d i n g o i l -f i l l e d c t l s w i t h SF6 et's. m e s o f C t ' s I n general, o i l -f i l l e d f r e e s t a n d i n g c t l s f a l l i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s .
The first type is t h e e y e b o l t o r through t y p e where a l l t h e c o r e s are l o c a t e d a t t h e t o p of t h e ct. A p i c t o r i a l view of t h e same t y p e of c t w i t h primary i n s u l a t i o n is shown i n f i g u r e 5 without t h e cores. Many of t h e 161-kV c t l s on TVA's system are of t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n . is somewhat similar t o t h e h a i r p i n type except t h a t one of t h e p r i m a r y c o n d u c t o r s i s c o n c e n t r i c a r o u n d a n o t h e r a s i t t r a v e r s e s t o t h e b a s e o f t h e c t . Another type of c t (shown i n f i g u r e 8 ) t h a t is g a i n i n g p o p u l a r i t y is a g a s -i n s u l a t e d c t u s i n g s u l f u r h e x a f l u o r i d e (SF6).
I n c o n t r a s t t o oil-impregnated paper ct's, SF6 c t ' s do not r e q u i r e many l a y e r s of paper and semiconducting t a p e which must be a p p l i e d and processed c a r e f u l l y t o e n s u r e adequate dryness and f u l l p e n e t r a t i o n by o i l to e l i m i n a t e voids. A t t h e p r e s e n t time, TVA does not have many SF6 c t ' s on its system. However, t h o s e t h a t p e r f o r m e d w e l l . Sul f u r h e x a f l u o r i d e can be r e l i e d upon t o completely f i l l h i g h d i e l e c t r i c q u a l i t i e s .
I t is self h e a l i n g i n t h e event of electrical breakdown a n d c a n e l i m i n a t e f i r e h a z a r d s . CT a s i h y x i a n t i n a b s e n c e s u f f i c i e n t oxygen.
Nature o f F a i l u r e s
The n a t u r e of t h e f a i l u r e s is e x p l o s i v e and u s u a l l y r e s u l t s i n a fire.
Where et's a r e l o c a t e d p h y s i c a l l y c l o s e t o a breaker mechanism, t h e ensuing f i r e u s u a l l y e n g u l f s t h e c o n t r o l c a b i n e t and much of t h e w i r i n g a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s e c o n t r o l s .
The e x p l o s i v e n a t u r e of t h e c t f a i l u r e s p r o p e l s p o r c e l a i n products l o n g d i s t a n c e s (up t o 300 feet) and r e s u l t s i n e x t e n s i v e damage t o nearby equipment. Frequently o t h e r ct's and b r e a k e r s have t o be r e p a i r e d because of p o r c e l a i n damage.
Disconnect s w i t c h o p e r a t i n g r o d s have been broken, bent, and damaged e x t e n s i v e l y .
TVA was f o r t u n a t e t o remove some c t ' s b e f o r e they f a i l e d .
For example, one c t t h a t had been damaged by t h e f a i l u r e of a nearby c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e same b r e a k e r was removed f r o m s e r v i c e b e c a u s e o f t h e following g a s a n a l y s i s : hydrogen ( H p ) 11,530 ppm and a c e t y l e n e (C2H2) 6,800 ppm. This c t was taken t o t h e Power S e r v i c e Shops and d i s s e c t e d t o determine t h e cause and n a t u r e of gassing.
What was revealed was a s t o n i s h i n g . S i g n i f i c a n t paper burning was e v i d e n t approximately 18 i n c h e s above t h e c a p a c i t a n c e t a p connection and much of t h e paper d i e l e c t r i c was burned away.
There was no doubt t h a t t h i s c t was about t o f a i l i n an e x p l o s i v e manner as o t h e r c t ' s had done i n t h e p a s t . This c t provided t h e b e s t i n s i g h t as t o t h e n a t u r e of f a i l u r e s . Unfortunately, what is not known is how l o n g i t t a k e s t o erode once t h e d i e l e c t r i c f a i l u r e p r o c e s s starts.
TVA e s t a b l i s h e d a procedure t o check t h e g a s c o n t e n t of t h e o i l i n a l l c t ' s i n t h e system. This r e q u i r e s t a k i n g o i l samples p e r i o d i c a l l y and sending them t o t h e C e n t r a l Labs ( ( L S E ) f o r a n a l y s i s .
The r e s u l t s of t h e a n a l y s i s are recorded on a form shown i n f i g u r e s ga, gb, and 90.
(Note: H2 hydrogen; CH4
= m e t h a n e ; C2H4 = e t h y l e n e ; C2H6 e t h a n e ; C2H2 a c e t y l e n e ; CO = c a r b o n monoxide; CO2 = carbon d i o x i d e . ) F i g u r e 9a d e p i c t s gas i n o i l a n a l y s i s f o r t h e A-phase c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 161-kV breaker No.
a t Raccoon Hountain.
Note t h a t hydrogen (H2) was z e r o from March 21, 1980 t o April 9 , 1984. Subsequent samples t a k e n between March 8 , 1985 and April 19, 1985 showed a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n H2 (100 ppm t o 400 ppm) b e f o r e i t was removed from s e r v i c e .
W e a n t i c i p a t e t h a t t h e development of a monitor w i l l e n a b l e u s t o remove similar 'sick" c t ' s i n t h e f u t u r e . 
REMOVED FROM SERVICE
F i g u r e gb d e p i c t s gas-in-oil a n a l y s i s f o r t h e Aphase c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 500-kV breaker No. 5024 a t Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
Note t h e s i g n i f i c a n t amount of CO2 r e g i s t e r e d between November 26, 1979 and September 9, 1983 (3,110 ppm t o 6,650 ppm). The ct was degassed on September 18, 1983 t o c l e a n t h e o i l and remove t h e C02. After t h e v i o l e n t f a i l u r e of an 
a d j a c e n t c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e same breaker No. 5024, t h i s ct was checked on A p r i l 25, 1984. (Refer back t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e p r e v i o u s paragraph.) It should be s t a t e d t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h i s c t would have gone undetected had not a s i m i l a r ct f a i l e d earlier. F i g u r e 9c d e p i c t s gas-in-oil a n a l y s i s f o r t h e Bphase ct a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 161-kV breaker No. 918 a t
Raccoon Mountain.
Note t h a t t h e r e were no s i g n i f i c a n t combustible gases recorded o n l y one month p r i o r t o f a i l u r e . This c t f a i l u r e e p i t o m i z e s t h e problem t h e u t i l i t i e s face i n t r y i n g t o d e t e c t and remove a ct i n imminent danger of f a i l i n g v i o l e n t l y .
It is e v i d e n t t h a t c o n d i t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d r a p i d l y soon a f t e r t h e last oil a n a l y s i s was made.
It is i m p o s s i b l e t o consider t h a t t h e et's can be checked more f r e q u e n t l y t h a n once a month.
An o n l i n e continuous monitor a p p e a r s t o be t h e only s o l u t i o n . 
, 1985, t h e C-phase c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h pcb
No. 874 was removed from s e r v i c e because of h i g h g a s c o n t e n t (9,720 ppm H2 a n d 4,050 CH4).
What is unique about t h e g a s s i n g of t h i s ct is t h e amount of information a v a i l a b l e b e f o r e removal because i t had been equipped w i t h continuous hydrogen and power f a c t o r (P.F.) monitors.
The f o l l o w i n g r e a d i n g s were recorded a few days b e f o r e removal. > 1,000 9,720 (manual g a s a n a l y s i s ) i The P.F. s t a r t e d t o i n c r e a s e m a r k e d l y on August 29. A c l o s e examination of t h e hourly r e a d i n g s on August 31 r e v e a l e d t h e following. From t h e s e r e a d i n g s , one might conclude t h a t manual gas a n a l y s i s is not adequate t o d e t e c t and s u c c e s s f u l l y remove a g a s s i n g ct.
This i n f o r m a t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h a d i s s e c t i o n a n a l y s i s , should i n d i c a t e
t h e n a t u r e of f a i l u r e . A p r e l i m i n a r y a n a l y s i s of one ct i n d i c a t e d a p a r t i c l e count i n e x c e s s of 15,000 ppm, low d i e l e c t r i c (approximately 25 kV), low m o i s t u r e c o n t e n t ( l e s s t h a n 10 ppm), high P.F. ( i n e x c e s s of 1.0) where normal is less t h a n 0.05 percent.
F i e l d T e s t P r o n r a
Because of t h e many 161-kV f a i l u r e s a t Raccoon Mountain, a f i e l d t e s t program was i n i t i a t e d t o determine i f t h e r e were any system-related problems o r high-frequency t r a n s i e n t s being g e n e r a t e d a t Raccoon Mountain t h a t could p o s s i b l y cause f a i l u r e s t o t h e through-type ct's.
These tests were j u s t i f i e d because of concerns f o r s a f e t y t o o p e r a t i n g and maintenance personnel, t h e l o n g and c o s t l y o u t a g e s needed t o r e p l a c e equipment damaged by e x p l o s i o n s and o i l fires, a n d t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e 161-kV s w i t c h y a r d and s u b s t a t i o n s .
The tests were l o n g and q u i t e e x t e n s i v e . I n v e s t i g a t i o n s included i n t h e tests were as follows.
1.
2.
3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
System f a u l t s a t o r near t h e Raccoon Mountain swi tchyard Lightning arrester o p e r a t i o n s a t Raccoon Mountain
Switchyard s h i e l d i n g C o n t i n u i t y of s t a t i o n ground mat Gpounding o f c t bases and Corten-steel s u p p o r t s t r u c t u r e s B r e a k e r -i s o l a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s A. S i n g u l a r o p e r a t i o n of gang-operated B. Simultaneous o p e r a t i o n of both gang-operated P a r t i a l d i s c h a r g e w i t h i n ct's f o l l o w i n g o p e r a t i o n of d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s Magnitudes and f r e q u e n c i e s of 161-kV v o l t a g e s a t t h e primary of ct's w h i l e o p e r a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t s w i t c h e s Magnitudes and f r e q u e n c i e s of secondary c t c u r r e n t s w h i l e o p e r a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s Magnitudes and f r e q u e n c i e s of c t capacitance-tap c u r r e n t s w h i l e o p e r a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s Gas chromatographic a n a l y s i s b e f o r e and after o p e r a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s a s s o c i a t e d w i . E n e r g i z a t i o n and d e e n e r g i z a t i o n of B. Transmission l i n e r e c l o s i n g s C.
E n e r g i z a t i o n and d e e n e r g i z a t i o n of transformer t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s 13. T r a n s i e n t s upon s t a r t i n g pumped-storage u n i t s 14. T r a n s i e n t s upon s t o p p i n g pumped-storage u n i t s A. U n i t coastdown B.
Regeneration braking t y p e s .of d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s
The conclusions a r e contained i n an e x t e n s i v e report prepared by TVA d a t e d December 20, 1984.
I
It should be noted t h a t t h e magnitudes of t h e s e c u r r e n t s vary c o n s i d e r a b l y because v a r i o u s t y p e s of a i r b l a s t b r e a k e r s use d i f f e r e n t c a p a c i t a n c e v a l u e s f o r v o l t a g e g r a d i n g a c r o s s t h e open c o n t a c t s . Other i n f l u e n c i n g f a c t o r s might be t h e t y p e s o f i n s u l a t i o n c o n f i g u r a t i o n s u s e d by d i f f e r e n t m a n u f a c t u r e r s and t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e c t i n t h e s y s t e m . F i g u r e 10 shows t h a t t h e m a g n i t u d e of t r a n s i e n t s can be reduced by s e l e c t i n g t h e sequence i n which t h e two b r e a k e r -i s o l a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s are operated. When t h e b r e a k e r -i s o l a t i n g d i s c o n n e c t i n g switch o p p o s i t e t h e ct is i n t h e closed p o s i t i o n , t h e c t is energized a t approximately 20-30 p e r c e n t of o p e r a t i n g v o l t a g e through t h e g r a d i n g c a p a c i t a n c e a c r o s s t h e open c o n t a c t s of t h e breaker. Subsequent o p e r a t i o n of t h e d i s c o n n e c t i n g switch a d j a c e n t t o t h e c t w i t h t h i s p a r a l l e l v o l t a g e e s t a b l i s h e d s u b j e c t s t h e ct primary t o smaller s t e p changes of v o l t a g e . A t Raccoon Mountain t h e c u r r e n t r e d u c t i o n v a r i e d from 20-40 p e r c e n t depending upon t h e type of breaker and c t being t e s t e d .
For example, t h e maximum t r a n s i e n t measured (1,750 amperes) was reduced by 26 p e r c e n t ( t o 1,300 amperes).
15. Arcing p a t t e r n s of " v e r t i c a l -b r e a k " and " s c i s s o r " Figure 10 . 
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A s a r e s u l t of t h e s e tests, o p e r a t i n g c o n t r o l s of t h e d i s c o n n e c t i n g s w i t c h e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e low-side bank b r e a k e r s a t Raccoon Mountain were modified t o e s t a b l i s h a sequence of o p e r a t i o n t h a t would reduce t h e
c a p a c i t a n c e t a p c u r r e n t t r a n s i e n t s .
Although t h e effects of t h e s e t r a n s i e n t s on c t i n s u l a t i o n are not known, i t was f e l t t h a t reducing t h e c a p a c i t a n c e c u r r e n t l e v e l s would be h e l p f u l .
Task Force t o DeveloD S a f e t y Proce d u r e s and Monitorinn
Devices A s a r e s u l t of t h e deep concern f o r s a f e t y , TVA e s t a b l i s h e d a systemwide t a s k f o r c e t o develop s a f e t y procedures t h a t would e n s u r e p r o t e c t i o n of personnel d u r i n g a n i n t e r i m period w h i l e developing a monitoring system. The procedures are as follows.
The f o l l o w i n g minimum requirements do not p e r t a i n t o t r a n s i e n t personnel t h a t p a s s through a switchyard checking equipment and r e c o r d i n g data. Minimum requirements must be met, but r e s p o n s i b l e m a n a g e r s c a n do more i f c o n d i t i o n s w a r r a n t a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n .
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Switchyards which c o n t a i n s u s p e c t c t ' s s h a l l be locked d u r i n g normal o p e r a t i o n s . A s i g n s h a l l g i v e n o t i c e of t h e presence of t h e s e et's, and t h e ct's s h a l l be marked t o i d e n t i f y them t o employees from a d i s t a n c e .
A t t h e p r e s e n t time t h e words "suspect C t ' S " w i l l i n c l u d e t h e following. M a n u f a c t u r e r A ' s C t ' s having an ampere r a t i o of 5,000/5 o r h i g h e r
Inform employees and d i s t r i b u t o r s of t h e p o t e n t i a l hazards of s u s p e c t f r e e s t a n d i n g o i lf i l l e d c t ' s and t h e danger zones surrounding them.
The r e s p o n s i b l e manager/supervisor s h a l l e n s u r e t h a t employees under h i s s u p e r v i s i o n who e n t e r t h e switchyard work w i t h i n safe boundaries.
The r e s p o n s i b l e manager/supervisor s h a l l determine if any of t h e s u s p e c t c t ' s are w i t h i n 100 feet f o r 161 kV and 300 feet f o r 500 kV of t h e p l a c e where employees w i l l be l o c a t e d . If any are w i t h i n t h e s e d i s t a n c e s , t a k e a n o i l sample from t h e s u s p e c t et's w i t h i n t h e zone b e f o r e employee exposure t o determine e x i s t e n c e of a hazardous c o n d i t i o n . If t h e r e is less than 200-ppm H2 o r 10-ppm a c e t y l e n e , t h e c t ' s a r e t o be considered reasonably s a f e and no danger zone h a s t o be e s t a b l i s h e d .
T h e r e a f t e r , t a k e a sample on a monthly b a s i s u n l e s s s w i t c h i n g occurs.
If s w i t c h i n g occurs, a sample should be taken w i t h i n two weeks of t h e s w i t c h i n g i n c i d e n t t o e n s u r e t h e continued safe c o n d i t i o n of t h e ct's.
If t h e above procedure r e s u l t s i n t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a h a z a r d o u s c o n d i t i o n ( i n e x c e s s of 200-ppm H p o r 10-ppm a c e t y l e n e ) , one o r more of t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s s h a l l be taken o r e q u i v a l e n t p r o t e c t i o n provided:
Remove from s e r v i c e any c t ' s which exceed t h e gas l i m i t s , o r
B. Suspend a l l y a r d a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g employees w i t h i n t h e danger zone (100 feet f o r 161 kV and 300 feet f o r 500 kV of a ct exceeding t h e l i m i t s ) , o r E r e c t b a r r i e r s t o s h i e l d employees from p o s s i b l e missiles p r o d u c e d by a c a t a s t r o p h i c f a i l u r e of t h e c t , o r
Provide continuous monitoring f o r hydrogen w i t h a u d i o v i s u a l warnings t o e v a c u a t e t h e danger zone i f t h e hydrogen l e v e l begins t o i n c r e a s e .
C.
D.
Once s a f e t y procedures had been developed, t h e t a s k f o r c e d i r e c t e d its a t t e n t i o n t o developing methods t o determine how t o d e t e c t a n impending ct f a i l u r e so t h a t i t could be removed from s e r v i c e b e f o r e i t f a i l e d c a t a s t r o p h i c a l l y . T h i s same d e v i c e would a l s o be used t o r e t a i n et's on t h e system t h a t showed no evidence of a n impending f a i l u r e .
I n o r d e r t o accomplish t h e t a s k of developing a monitor, i t was f e l t t h a t t h e n a t u r e of t h e f a i l u r e would l o g i c a l l y impact t h e type of monitoring d e v i c e s e l e c t e d .
Therefore, i t was decided t o remove e t ' s from s e r v i c e t h a t showed evidence of continued g a s s i n g and i n s t a l l monitors on t h e s e d e v i c e s and r e e n e r g i z e them a t f u l l voltage. Heretofore, t h e only method t o A t TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear P l a n t , o i l samples a r e taken monthly on f i f t y -s e v e n 161-kV o i lf i l l e d ct's which e q u a t e s t o $136,800 p e r year. Thus, over t h e e s t i m a t e d l i f e of t h e ct (assume 30-year l i f e ) , t h e c o s t would exceed $4 m i l l i o n . The amount of o i l t a k e n would r e q u i r e t h a t t h e o i l be reprocessed every f i v e y e a r s . This is e s t i m a t e d t o c o s t $500 p e r ct which is e q u i v a l e n t t o $171,000 over t h e l i f e of t h e ct. While t h i s amount is i n s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e c o s t of o i l s a m p l e s t a k e n o n a m o n t h l y b a s i s , r i s k s a r e i n c u r r e d when r e p r o c e s s i n g t h e o i l . Care must be taken t o properly purge t h e system and upon reinserting t h e o i l care must be t a k e n t o prevent n i t r o g e n bubbles from accumulating i n t h e paper voids. It is a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t a s u i t a b l e f a i l u r e d e t e c t i o n monitoring system w i l l e l i m i n a t e t h e need f o r manual t e s t i n g and would e n s u r e t h a t t h e ct could be removed from s e r v i c e b e f o r e a c a t a s t r o p h i c f a i l u r e occurred.
S i n c e t h e r e a r e numerous monitoring t e c h n i q u e s a v a i l a b l e , i t was not c e r t a i n t h a t any of them would d e t e c t symptoms of t h e t r o u b l e i n time t o prevent a c a t a s t r o p h i c c t f a i l u r e .
With today's technology w e e l e c t e d t o test symptoms which monitor hydrogen g a s , p a r e r f a c t o r , c a p a c i t a n c e , p r e s s u r e , temperature, and p a r t i a l discharge.
The tests r e q u i r e d would be t o e v a l u a t e t h e most s u i t a b l e of t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s and t h e n i n s t a l l t h e a p p r o p r i a t e monitoring system on t h e remaining f r e e s t a n d i n g c t ' s w i t h i n t h e TVA system.
The Wilson 500-kV S u b s t a t i o n was s e l e c t e d as a s u i t a b l e test s i t e f o r t h i s purpose.
W e a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t when t h e g a s s i n g c t ' s were energized a t r a t e d v o l t a g e , g a s s i n g would not only c o n t i n u e but would a c c e l e r a t e a s i n t e r n a l ct damage progressed.
I n g e n e r a l , t h i s was t r u e of t h e tests on t h e 161-kV ct's.
Unfortunately, t h e tests of t h e 500-kV e t ' s showed no evidence of continued gassing. W e a t t r i b u t e d t h i s t o removing t h e c t ' s from s e r v i c e b e f o r e i t could be c l e a r l y a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t t h e c t ' s were i n imminent danger of f a i l u r e .
However, most of t h e 161-kV e t ' s d i d e x h i b i t s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e s i n hydrogen g a s and power f a c t o r . This w i l l b e covered i n more d e t a i l i n a companion paper.
It is planned t o t a k e one of t h e 161-kV ct's t o f a i l u r e .
I n o r d e r t o minimize t h e e x t e n t of damage, t h e ct w i l l be f e d r a d i a l l y from a remote s u b s t a t i o n t o reduce t h e f a u l t c u r r e n t s t o less t h a n 3,000 amperes. S e n s i t i v e f a u l t monitoring d e v i c e s should p r o v i d e f a u l t c l e a r i n g w i t h i n t h r e e cycles.
The purpose of t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e test is t o r e v e a l c o n d i t i o n s j u s t b e f o r e f a i l u r e . If t h e i n t e r n a l p r e s s u r e and n e u t r a l c u r r e n t make a d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e j u s t b e f o r e f a i l u r e , t h e s e n s i n g r e l a y s might be s u c c e s s f u l l y used as p r o t e c t i v e d e v i c e s t o t r i p t h e s o u r c e breaker. A t t h e p r e s e n t time, t h e s e q u a n t i t i e s are only being monitored.
The ground r e l a y is set t o p i c k up ( b u t not t r i p ) a t 100 milliamps which is approximately double t h e s t a t i c capaoi t a n c e to ground c u r r e n t .
A b a r r i e r and p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d h a s been i n s t a l l e d around each c t being t e s t e d i n t h e event t h a t a n e x p l o s i v e f a i l u r e should occur. This is shown i n F i g u r e 11.
The sample c t is connected t o a t r a n s f e r b u s t h r o u g h a b r e a k e r a n d p r o t e c t e d by r e l a y s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e breaker. A t 161-kV a dropout f u s e is a l s o i n s t a l l e d t o e n s u r e a d d i t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n . If a f a i l u r e does occur, t h e r e l a y s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e breaker w i l l t r i p t h e breaker i n approximately t h r e e c y c l e s and t h e p r o t e d t i v e b a r r i e r made up of a c h a i n l i n k f e n c e and plywood should c o n t a i n f l y i n g p o r c e l a i n , d e b r i s , etc. When t h e 161-kV c t ' s are energized from a remote s u b s t a t i o n t o reduce t h e f a u l t c u r r e n t , t h e remote breaker w i l l t r i p by its connected carrier re1 ay s .
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PROPOSEDTESTARRANGEMENT A l l m o n i t o r i n g s y s t e m s r e c o r d i n f o r m a t i o n continuously. This i n f o r m a t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e postmortem e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c t ' s s h o u l d p r o v i d e i n v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n as t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e f a i l u r e and t h e a b i l i t y of each monitoring system under test t o a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t a n i m p e n d i n g c t f a i l u r e . Westinghouse h a s been employed t o assist i n e v a l u a t i n g two 161-kV c t ' s t h a t were removed from s e r v i c e b e f o r e f a i l u r e . These c t ' s w i l l be s u b j e c t e d t o e x t e n s i v e tests and t h e n a teardown w i l l be made and a l l f i n d i n g s r e p o r t e d i n d e t a i l .
C O N C L U W W e have c o l l e c t e d s u f f i c i e n t d a t a from t h e 161-kV c t tests t o feel comfortable w i t h t h e power f a c t o r monitoring system and t o some e x t e n t t h e hydrogen monitoring system. F i n a l c o n c l u s i o n s w i l l not be made u n t i l a l l d a t a h a s been c o l l e c t e d . T h i s w i l l i n c l u d e t h e r e s u l t s of t h e tear-down tests made by Westinghouse and t h e c a t a s t r o p h i c f a i l u r e test which w i l l be made i n t h e s p r i n g of 1987.
TVA h a s a l r e a d y made p l a n s t o purchase SF6 ct's t o r e p l a c e a l l e x i s t i n g f r e e s t a n d i n g o i l -f i l l e d 500-kV ct's a t its Watts Bar Nuclear P l a n t and f r e e s t a n d Online Monitoring of F r e e s t a n d i n g O i l -F i l l e d Current Transformers t o P r e d i c t Imminent F a i l u r e " ) is e v e r p r e s e n t and is g e n e r a t e d by t h e need t o :
(1) p r o t e c t personnel, ( 2 ) relax t h e s t r i n g e n t s a f e t y procedures now i n effect, and ( 3 ) Subsequently became a Relay P r o t e c t i o n Engineer; A s s i s t a n t Chief, System Load Dispatcher; S u p e r v i s o r , Relay and P r o t e c t i o n S e c t i o n ; and is c u r r e n t l y a S p e c i a l P r o j e c t s Manager i n t h e D i v i s i o n of Operations Support.
He is Vice Chairman of t h e Power System Relaying Committee of t h e Power Engineering S o c i e t y , a member of t h e Executive Committee of t h e Georgia Tech Relay Conference, former u t i l i t y a d v i s o r f o r t h e E l e c t r i c Power Research I n s t i t u t e , and a member 
After a p e r i o d of training became an Electrical Engineer i n t h e C e n t r a l L a b o r a t o r i e s and s t i l l h o l d s t h a t p o s i t i o n .
J3arrv W. &Q r e c e i v e d a B.S. from U n i v e r s i t y of Tennessee a t Chattanooga i n Engineering Science i n 1974 and an M.S. i n Electrical Engineering i n 1981 from t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f T e n n e s s e e .
J o i n e d TVA I n 1974 as E l e c t r i c a l Engineer i n Relay and P r o t e c t i o n Branch; i n 1976 became a F i e l d T e s t Engineer a t Raccoon Mountain Pumped-Storage and Sequoyah Nuclear P l a n t s ; i n 1980 r e t u r n e d t o Relay and P r o t e c t i o n Branch; and i n 1983 j o i n e d t h e Technical Support Branch as an E l e c t r i c a l Engineer t o review and d e s i g n tests necessary f o r acceptance of power equipment.
Discussiod
Nicolei Korponay (BBC Brown Boveri, Zurich, Switzerland) and Alfred Leibold (BBC Brown Boveri, North Brunswick, NJ): As a supplier of more than 100, OOO freestanding oil-filled current transformers in operation for service voltages up to 800 kV, we share TVA's concern about the extra high failure rate experienced in their system. The failure rate experienced deviates drastically from failures experienced on freestanding installed worldwide, including different manufacturers and deviate even more from failure statistics of our own design.
1) It may be pointed out that most failures occurred with designs of one manufacturer with an insufficient design. An extra large number of failures with this type of CT's were reported during the 1985 Doble conference, which required several hundred CT's in South America and similar problems were experienced in Thailand, Iran and other countries. 2) Reported world failure rates for oil-fdled CT's are in the range of 0.05% per year of installation, compared with 0.008% average over the last 25 years with our own design. It may be of interest to mention in this context an in-depth investigation performed in Switzerland with results published 1981 in the SEV-bulletin. we introduce -after several years of testing and field experience -CT's with non-ceramic type insulators with silicon sheds. Such a design offers the added advantage of better performance in areas with severe contamination problems. 4) The power factor table on page 4 shows a starting value of .97%, which is considerably above an acceptable level in the range of 0.5 % .
According to our experience, the type of oil used may have contributed to the failures experienced, but can not be considered the cause of the problems. It can be excluded as general cause since otherwise CT's from other manufacturers would have experienced a similar failure rate, which is not the case.
5) The conclusion mentions magnetic optic devices available in the future. Such CT's are already commercially available and the first 3 units for 420 kV supplied to a Utility in Finland after several years of testing and trial installation. A broader application will be possible only with the introduction of digital relays with direct optical connection to avoid the rather expensive amplifier. 1) It is difficult for a user of ct's to determine that one manufacturer has a design deficiency. We are inclined to believe that there may be a combination of things that causes the failures. We now believe that oil plays a significant role in ct design and it appears that the best oils are derived from naphthinic crude high in aromatic content from North American coastal crude oil fields. Tests indicate that some Arabian oil which is low in aromatic content and has a high content of long chain paraffins may not be suitable for use in current transformers. 2) Pressure monitoring was one of four concepts explored by TVA to help remove a defective ct from service before catastrophic failure. The other three include power factor monitoring, hydrogen monitoring, and leakage current detection. We theorize that just before failure pressure may go up substantially, leakage current may go up significantly, and we have documentation that shows power factor and hydrogen go up dramatically before a ct fails. TVA's present plans include monitoring suspect ct's (those that have given trouble in the past) with a power factor and/or hydrogen monitor. There are no plans at the present to install pressure or leakage current ground sensors. 3) No comment. 4) The power factor of .97 on page 4 is an example of a deteriorating ct.
The power factor increased dramatically in four or five days and the hydrogen monitor showed a significant increase approximately two days later. The purpose of the table was to show how well the power factor and hydrogen monitors performed. We agree that the type of oil may have contributed to the failures experienced on TVA's system. While most of our failures were by one manufacturer, we have experienced a significant number of failures by other manufacturers and have concluded that all manufacturers of freestanding oil-filled ct's must consider the quality of the oil installed in ct's as part of its design criteria. As a matter of interest, TVA is developing specifications for oil used in freestanding current transformers. 5 ) Magneto-optic devices may be a viable option in the future and while we would like to consider such a device, we believe it is too experimental to pursue at the present time. Since TVA needed immediate relief, it elected to purchase SF-6 ct's as replacement for some of the suspect freestanding oil-filled ct's on its system. TVA will continue to pursue this matter while gaining operating experience with SF-6 ct's and oil-filled ct's filled with oil purchased according to its new specifications.
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